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MEDELLN. THE NEW, NEW FORMALISM?
by
Ingrid Wuerth
The Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Medellin v. Texas appears to
represent a formalist turn in the Court's approach to foreign relations cases.
The opinion emphasizes text as the key to treaty interpretationand it stresses
the importance of the Constitution'sspecific law-making procedures. But the
opinion does not deliver on its formalist promises. Emphasis on treaty text is
undermined by the Court's insistence that the text reflects the intentions of
the U.S. treaty-makers, a questionable proposition with respect to the issue of
domestic implementation raised by the case, and one that will raise serious
interpretative difficulties down the road. Most significantly, however, the
opinion is saddled with an unnecessary and unconvincing application of
Justice Jackson's tripartiteYoungstown framework. The Court concludes
that the President's effort to implement the treaty falls within the third
category, but the indicia of congressional intent that the Court relies on are
weak, and the analysis works a substantial expansion of this category.
Moreover, as the Court frames the issue-one of treaty interpretation-itis
unclearwhy Youngstown should apply at all.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The decision in Medellin v. Texas looks like a significant victory for
formalists in many respects. The Court rejected what it termed the
dissent's "multifactor, judgment-byjudgment" test for treaty selfexecution' that would 'jettison relative predictability" 2 and opted instead
for a text-based analysis of treaties.3 The decision also rejected the
President's efforts to use the courts to enforce a non-self-executing treaty
Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks to Professor Ernest Young
for helpful comments.
A self-executing treaty "has automatic domestic effect as federal law," while a
non-self-executing treaty requires legislation to give it domestic effect. Medellfn v.
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 n.2 (2008).
2 Id. at 1362 (quotingJerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co.,
513 U.S. 527, 547 (1995)).
' Id. at 1362.
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against the state of Texas. 4 If the Court's foreign affairs reasoning had
once turned toward formalism in the late 1990s, 5 its 2003 and 2004
decisions in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi.6 and Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain7 veered decidedly in the other direction." In this context,
the Medellin opinion reads in places like a breath of formalist fresh air,
emphasizing both the importance of the Constitution's specific lawmaking procedures in the context of treaties 9 and a text-based
interpretation of treaties aimed to vest control over foreign relations with
the political branches, not the courts.10
Upon closer examination, however, Medellin looks less like a victory
for formalists. Instead of cabining judicial discretion in treaty
interpretation with clear presumptions and interpretive rules, the Court's
self-execution analysis relies on a series of factors that seem to focus on
treaty text as a vehicle for understanding the intentions of the U.S. treatymakers. The focus on intent is in some tension with formalist
interpretative principles, and is especially problematic in the context of
treaty interpretation. Similarly, while the Court emphasizes the formal
requirements for law-making in considering the President's power to
enforce non-self-executing treaties," this analysis is watered down by the
Court's apparent acceptance that the President might, with sufficient
acquiescence by Congress, be able to enforce a non-self-executing treaty
in court absent implementing legislation."' This section of the opinion is
also saddled with an odd, expansive, and unnecessary discussion of
Justice Jackson's tripartite Youngstown framework-generally viewed as
functionalist rather than formalist in approach.'2 In both sections of the
opinion, the lack of clarity and the tensions with formalism are generated
in part by the Court's emphasis on the intentions of the U.S. treaty-

Id. at 1367-72.
SeeJack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70
U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1424-30 (1999).

539 U.S. 396 (2003).
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
See Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association
v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825,
912-13 (2004) (criticizing the Court's decision as contrary to constitutional text and
longstanding practice); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A
FunctionalApproach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 153, 154 (2004) (arguing
that the Sosa decision was based on functional reasoning).
9 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,79 TEx. L.
REv. 1321, 1326-27, 1391-92 (2001).
'0 See Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1424.
" Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J.
INT'L L. 540, 547-50 (2008).
12 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1370 (2008).
" See Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalismfor Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L. REv.
18,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
(forthcoming),
manuscript
at
sol3/papers .cfm?abstractid=1134887; Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the
Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 442 (2007).
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makers as the key to understanding both which treaties are self-executing
and the domestic status of those that are not.
II. INTENT AND SELF-EXECUTION

-

The Medellin opinion states in several places that courts should look
to the intentions of the U.S. treaty-makers to determine whether a treaty
is self-executing.14 This focus on intent undermines the Court's effort to
cabin judicial discretion in treaty interpretation in several ways. As an
initial matter, the opinion goes on to suggest that it is the intent of the
parties to the treaty that is relevant 15 and relies on factors that seem to
bear little relation to the intent of the domestic treaty-makers (i.e., the
Senate and the President). Most significantly, the Court lists "'the
postratification understanding' of signatory nations" as one of the three
major tools of treaty interpretation and concludes that in this case the
practices of the 47 nations party to the optional protocol and the 17117
nations party to the Vienna Conventions confirm that the Avena
judgment is not self-executing. The post-ratification practice of other
countries is a weak way to evaluate the intentions of the Senate and the
President as to self-execution, but is much more directly linked to the
intentions of other countries and to the shared understanding of the
parties as to the meaning of the treaty's text.
The Court's heavy reliance on treaty text is also in some tension with
its strong emphasis on the intentions of the U.S. treaty-makers. Even in
the domestic statutory context-the opinion equates treaty and statutory

Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1366 ("Our cases simply require courts to decide whether
a treaty's terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the
Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect."); id. at 1367 ("Nothing
...suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the
judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by 'many of
our most fundamental constitutional protections."' (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006)); id. at 1358 ("Article 94 ...[does not] indicate
that the Senate that ratified the U.N. charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with
immediate legal effect in domestic courts."); id. at 1361 ("The Executive Branch has
unfailingly adhered to its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically
enforceable federal law."); id. at 1356 (asking whether the "'treaty itself conveys an
intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms"' (quoting IgartuaDe La Rosa v. United States, 417 E3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)); id. at 1359 ("as the
President and the Senate were undoubtedly aware in subscribing to the U.N. Charter
and Optional Protocol .. ").
'" Id. at 1362 (reasoning that the text of the 1819 land-grant treaty in Foster and
Percheman "indicated the parties' intent to ratify and confirm the land-grant 'by
force of the instrument itself."' (quoting U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87
(1833)).
16 Id. at 1357 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S.
217, 226
(1996)).
'7 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1363.
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interpretation in terms of their reliance on text' -the
distinction
20
between textualism and intentionalism is a familiar one. In the context
of determining whether a complex group of interrelated multilateral
treaty regimes have generated a self-executing judgment, gleaning the
"intentions" of the President and the Senate from the treaty texts is
especially difficult. Countries vary substantially in their domestic
implementation of treaties, so it is difficult to discern any collective
intentions from the text itself,21 much less how the intentions of one state
out of dozens or scores of states is reflected (or not) in the text. The
problem is compounded by U.S. courts' general confusion around selfexecution: the courts' approaches have not done anything to give the
Senate and the President clear interpretive rules against which they can
legislate.
A better guide to the intentions of the U.S. treaty-makers may be
their own statements, and the Medellin opinion cites to the views of the
Executive Branch both during and following the Senate hearings. 22 It
does not cite to statements from the Senate or its members, but the
opinion's
•
23language focuses specifically on Senate intent, inviting such
evidence. Justice Scalia has strongly opposed the use of any statements
from the Senate advice and consent hearings as an aid to treaty
interpretation,24 and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor have opposed their
use unless treaty text is unclear (a determination that the Medellin court
did not make). 2 ' YetJustices Scalia and Kennedy both joined the Medellin
opinion without comment. Perhaps the question of self-execution is
distinct from other issues of treaty interpretation and, as suggested above,
uniquely implicates questions of Senate and Presidential intent that are
difficult to resolve through the text of the treaty itself. Or perhaps those
who oppose the use of legislative history in both the statutory and treaty
context believe that with the addition of Justices Roberts and Alito to the

Id. at 1357.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 547 (1983).
21 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1381 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
22 Id. at 1359, 1361.
213 See id. at 1358 (" ...
nor indicate that the Senate that ratified the U.N. Charter
9

20

intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in the domestic courts.");
id. at 1360 (" ... no reason to believe that the President and Senate signed up for
such a result."); id. at 1362 ("[text] is after all what the Senate looks to in deciding
whether to approve the treaty."); id. at 1362 (" ... President making the treaty and
the Senate approving it."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw
OF THE UNITED STATES § 325, Rep. n.5 (1987) (courts take into account "[c]ommittee
reports, debates, and other indications of meaning that the legislative branch has
attached to an agreement ....
");United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989)
(defending the use of legislative materials in treaty interpretation outside selfexecution context); contra id. at 375 (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment).
24 Stuart, 489 U.S. at 371-77 (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment).
25 Id. at 370 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(joined by Justice O'Connor).
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Court, their cause is a lost one.26 In any event, citation to legislative
history in Medellin generally runs counter to the opinion's privileging of
treaty text as the product of a "careful set of procedures that must be
followed before federal law can be created under the Constitution";
27
namely "the President making the treaty and the Senate approving it.
The word "make" comes, of course, from Article II of the Constitution,
and the Court uses it here to emphasize the importance of the specific
procedures the Constitution requires for the creation of federal law.
This tension also emerges to some extent with respect to Senate
declarations of non-self-execution (not at issue in Medellin), which
arguably by-pass the President making the treaty by allowing the Senate
and the President to determine the domestic status of treaties through
language that is not part of the regular, negotiated treaty-text. On the
other hand, such declarations are conveyed to our treaty partners as part
of the ratification process, and they also better reflect at least the
collective intentions of the U.S. treaty-makers, and thus avoid some of the
problems that arise in the use of legislative history. Similar issues arise
with respect to declarations of self-execution that purport to make a
treaty into domestic law (or explicitly provide a domestic cause of action)
even if the treaty itself clearly (or implicitly) does not contemplate selfexecution or other aspects of its domestic effect. Indeed, the tension
between the intentions of the U.S. treaty-makers and the formal
requirements of law-making are even more acute in this context, because
the U.S. treaty-makers are attempting to create domestic law without the
consent of foreign nations required to make a treaty.28
III. YOUNGSTOWN AND MEDELLIN
The second part of the Medellin opinion considers the President's
power to implement the Avenajudgment based on what it frames as two
distinct arguments: the treaties involved in the case and the history of
claim settlement by the President. As to the first, the Court emphasizes
the importance of formal law making procedures, and concludes that a
non-self-executing treaty made by the President and consented to by the
Senate cannot be "convert[ed]" into a "self-executing one., 29 This
analysis is straightforward enough-if a welcome change from

26 See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 501-02 (2006); see also Elliot M.
Davis, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alitos Statutory Interpretation, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 983 (2007) (arguing that Justice Alito relies on legislative history more readily
than Justice Scalia).
27 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1362 (emphasis added); see also ANTONIN SCALIA,
A
MATTIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 34-35 (1997).
21 Cf Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM.
L. REv. 331, 350 n.109
(2008) (noting that "any international agreement also requires a foreign partner,
which limits the potential for self-aggrandizement.").

Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368.
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Garamendi30-but the Court's effort to shoehorn its reasoning into Justice
Jackson's Youngstown categories is strained.
To the extent that the President relies on treaties for authority, and
they do not provide such authority, then recourse to Youngstown seems
misplaced. Youngstown was, in other words, a case about constitutional
review of executive actions,31 but in this part of the opinion the Court is
not evaluating (explicitly anyway) a claim by the President of
constitutional authority, but instead the claim that "the relevant treaties
... give the President the authority to implement [the Avena
judgment] . ' 2 The opinion appears to relegate any constitutional
considerations to the claim settlement power which it characterized as
"of a different nature than the one rejected above." 33 Even the opinion's
opening sentence about Youngstown-reasoning that Justice Jackson's
"tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating
executive action in this area"-signals confusion, as it is entirely unclear
what it means with "this area.,
34

The second oddity about the Court's Youngstown analysis is the
conclusion that the President's assertion of authority is in Justice
Jackson's third category. Because the relevant treaties are non-selfexecuting, the Court reasons, they "implicitly prohibit" the President
from enforcing them in domestic courts.35 As a backward looking
statement about the actual "understanding of the ratifying Senate," this
claim seems hard to defend. Given the lack of clarity about self-execution
itself (much less its relationship to presidential power) and the treaties'
silence on these questions, it is very difficult to see how the Senate could
have had any particular understanding of what the fact of non-selfexecution (itself implied, not stated) would mean for the President's
executive power, especially when the underlying treaty may well be selfexecuting.
This is only the first time a majority of the Court has explicitly
categorized an action of the President as coming within Justice Jackson's
third category, and it is a more expansive application of that category
than in prior concurring opinions. In Youngstown itself Congress had
deliberated-and refused-to give the President the power he later
exercised. 6 In Hamdan, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion puts the
" Justice Kennedy is the only Justice who joined the majority opinions in both
Garamendiand Medellin.
3' Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IowA L. REv. 539 (2005).
32. Medelin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368. Later the Court characterizes the argument as
"relying on the United States' treaty obligations." Id. at 1371.
31 Id. at 1371; see also id. at 1368 ("dispute-resolution power [is] wholly apart from
the asserted authority based on the pertinent treaties"). Not surprisingly, this is not
how the government litigated the case.
3' Id. at 1350.
15 Id. at 1351.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1952). Justice
Black's opinion for the Court agreed with Justice Jackson on this point, but did not
HeinOnline -- 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 6 2009
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President's actions in category three because while the relevant statutes
"provide authority for certain forms of military courts, they also impose
• ,
37
limitations," which the President's order transgressed. Justice Stevens's
opinion for the Court in Hamdan acknowledges as much in a footnote,
but does not explicitly put the case in one ofJustice Jackson's categories.
In contrast to Hamdan, in Medellin the President acted consistently with
an intertwined set of treaty commitments made by the Vienna
Convention's optional protocol and the U.N. Charter; it is difficult to see
the failure to force language of self-execution into these major
multilateral treaty regimes as an implicit limitation on the President's
power to act to enforce the treaty.
Finally, this conclusion seems at odds with the CharmingBetsy canon,
which directs that "where fairly possible" courts are to construe statutes
"so as not to conflict with international law or with an international
agreement of the United States."3" Although this case involved the
interpretation of treaties, not statutes, it is hard to see why the canon
would not apply equally to treaties. If the canon is based on the
presumptive intentions of Congress, 9 its application to treaties
(reflecting the presumptive intentions of the Senate) seems more
straightforward than to statutes, because Congress may not even consider
international obligations when passing a statute, but the Senate would
almost certainly do so when consenting to a treaty. If the canon is based
on separation of powers considerations _Courts should not put the
United States in violation of its international obligations unless the
political branches clearly intend to do so-then it would seem to apply
here to prevent the Court from interpreting a treaty in a way that puts
the United States in violation
of
•
41 international obligations contrary to the
explicit views of the President.

explicitly apply Jackson's tripartite structure; compare id. at 694 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
" Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 639, 653 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,concurring);
see also id. at 593 n.23 (majority opinion) (suggesting that the case falls within Justice
Jackson's third category); see also New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 740
(1971) (White, J., concurring) (citing Youngstown and noting that "Congress has
addressed itself to the problems of protecting the security of the country and the
national defense from unauthorized disclosure of potentially damaging information"
but that Congress has not "authorized the injunctive remedy against threatened
publication.").
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 114.
" Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizationsfor the Use of Force, InternationalLaw and the
Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REv. 293, 333-38 (2005).
'0Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separationof Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw, 86 GEO.L.J. 479, 524-25 (1998).
4 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), is distinguishable both because
the case was resolved in keeping with the views of the Executive Branch and because
the case did not involve individuals named in the Avenajudgment.

HeinOnline -- 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 7 2009

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:1

The Court's Youngstown analysis is arguably strengthened by the
federal habeas statute, which carefully limits the power of federal courts
to interfere in state criminal cases. 42 The President's efforts to enforce
the Avenajudgment in Texas state court are, this argument goes, an "endrun around" the restrictions in the habeas statute and thus belong in
Youngstown category three.43 But apparently the federal habeas regime is
largely directed to the relationship between federal and state courts, not
presidential power. In Youngstown and Hamdan, by contrast, the
intentions of Congress were gleaned from statutes that specifically
addressed the question of executive authority of precisely the sort at issue
in the case. Even had the Medellin Court relied on this argument, it would
still have worked a substantial expansion of Youngstown category three;
perhaps for this reason it did not rely on the habeas argument. Moreover,
had it done so, the Court would have strengthened the President's
argument that loosely related statutes
evinced congressional
authorization for his enforcement of the Avenajudgment. 44 Instead, the
Court rejected the claim that Congress had authorized the President's
actions and based its category three conclusion on the fact that the
treaties were self-executing, but not on the federal habeas statute.
Looking forward, of course, with benefit of this opinion, it is far
clearer that when the Senate ratifies a non-self-executing treaty, the
President will lack the power to enforce it in domestic courts. But by
stuffing the treaty analysis into the doesn't-really-fit Youngstown
framework, the Court undermines the formalist reasoning in this and
other parts of the opinion. The Youngstown framework is about the will of
Congress, not the formal constitutional requirements for lawmaking, and
the opinion leaves open the question of whether the President could
enforce a non-self-executing treaty in domestic courts if the Senate and
President attached a declaration to a treaty stating that the treaty was not
self-executing but could nevertheless be enforced by the President in
domestic courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, perhaps formalism and the self-execution doctrine are
strange bedfellows. Formalism's emphasis on the Constitution's specific
procedure for enacting federal laws is difficult to effectuate in the
context of self-execution, because the distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties is of constitutional significance, yet is not
reflected in the Constitution's text. Formalist emphasis on text (at least in
the statutory context) puts treaties in a difficult spot. Their text is

42 Amicus Curiae Brief of Constitutional and International Law Scholars in
Support of Respondent State of Texas at 4, 14-17, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346
(2008) (No. 06-984).

4 Id. at 17.

Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371 (2008).
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9

negotiated to reflect the will of the treaty parties as a whole, yet is also the
principle vehicle for understanding the will of the U.S. treaty-makers with
respect to the (still) complicated questions about the enforceability of
treaties in domestic courts. Reliance on statements of the President and
Senate ease that pressure on treaty text, but also seem to represent a
retreat from some versions of formalism. The Court's limping formalism
is perhaps most obvious in its application of Justice Jackson's framework
in Youngstown; a discussion of the importance of formal law-making is
sandwiched between two decidedly odd Youngstown analyses. In these, the
Court first concludes that Justice Jackson's framework for constitutional
review applies to a question of pure treaty interpretation, and then
substantially expands the third category of the framework by reaching to
conclude that the "ratifying parties" to the treaties implicitly prohibitedthe
President from enforcing them. The unnecessary Youngstown analysis, like
other aspects of the opinion, make it hard to predict whether Medellin
signals a formalist turn in the Court's approach to foreign affairs.
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